Moral Responsibility and Autism

This paper addresses two claims. First, it argues against Shoemaker’s claim that autistic people are not accountable for their actions. It begins by examining the empirical evidence on which Shoemaker bases his conclusion, suggesting that apparent deficits in empathy can, at least in part, be explained by differences in emotional expression. Next, the position is strengthened by arguing that, even if the empathic abilities of some autistic people (as compared to non-autistic people) are lacking, Shoemaker’s argument that empathy is required for moral accountability is implausible.

Second, the paper considers Stout’s claim that autism poses a problem for reasons-responsive theories of moral responsibility. It argues that, on the contrary, this approach nicely captures plausible judgements concerning when autistic people should be thought of as morally responsible for their acts and omissions. Given the dynamic nature of this disability, each attribution of moral responsibility must be assessed on a case-by-case basis. But this marks no difference in kind to our standard practices of attributing moral responsibility.