Non-Walrasian decentralization of the core

Leonidas C. Koutsougeras, Nicholas Ziros

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


We show that in large finite economies, core allocations can be approximately decentralized as Nash (rather than Walras) equilibrium. We argue that this exercise is an essential complement to asymptotic core equivalence results, because it implies that in some approximate sense individual attempts to manipulate the decentralizing prices cannot be beneficial, which fits precisely the interpretation of asymptotic core convergence, namely the emergence of price taking. © 2011.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)610-616
Number of pages6
JournalJournal of Mathematical Economics
Issue number4-5
Publication statusPublished - Aug 2011


  • Asymptotic proximity
  • Core
  • Decentralization
  • Nash equilibrium


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