Non-Walrasian equilibria and the law of one price

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Abstract

We present a market game which features multiple posts for each commodity. We use this framework to illustrate the idea that in non-Walrasian markets, where individual activities influence market clearing prices, there are equilibria where commodities are exchanged simultaneously in two posts at different prices, thus defying the 'law of one price'. Such equilibria are compatible with an apparent arbitrage possibility, which dissipates whenever individuals try to take advantage of it. © 2003 Elsevier Science (USA). All rights reserved.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)169-175
Number of pages6
JournalJournal of Economic Theory
Volume108
Issue number1
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Jan 2003

Keywords

  • Arbitrage
  • Law of one price
  • Multiple posts

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