On an argument for humility

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Considerations upon the nature of properties and laws have led some philosophers to claim that the correct epistemic attitude with regards to the intrinsic properties of particulars is scepticism. I examine one particularly clear version of this line of argument, and contend that a serious form of scepticism is not established. However, I argue that the theories of properties and laws underlying the argument have unwanted metaphysical implications. These provide a stronger reason to jettison the analyses. I end by sketching an alternative view that avoids these difficulties. © Springer 2006.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)461-497
Number of pages36
JournalPhilosophical Studies
Issue number3
Publication statusPublished - Sept 2006


  • Humility
  • Laws
  • Metaphysics
  • Properties


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