On strategic complementarities in discontinuous games with totally ordered strategies

Pavlo Prokopovych; Nicholas C. Yannelis

doi:10.1016/j.jmateco.2017.02.007

On strategic complementarities in discontinuous games with totally ordered strategies

Pavlo Prokopovych, Nicholas C. Yannelis

Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

This paper studies the existence of a pure strategy Nash equilibrium in games with strategic complementarities where the strategy sets are totally ordered. By relaxing the conventional conditions related to upper semicontinuity and single crossing, we enlarge the class of games to which monotone techniques are applicable. The results are illustrated with a number of economics-related examples.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	147-153
Number of pages	7
Journal	Journal of Mathematical Economics
Volume	70
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2017.02.007
Publication status	Published - 2017

Keywords

Discontinuous game
Strategic complementarities
Better-reply security
Directional transfer single crossing
Increasing correspondence

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10.1016/j.jmateco.2017.02.007

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title = "On strategic complementarities in discontinuous games with totally ordered strategies",

abstract = "This paper studies the existence of a pure strategy Nash equilibrium in games with strategic complementarities where the strategy sets are totally ordered. By relaxing the conventional conditions related to upper semicontinuity and single crossing, we enlarge the class of games to which monotone techniques are applicable. The results are illustrated with a number of economics-related examples.",

keywords = "Discontinuous game, Strategic complementarities, Better-reply security, Directional transfer single crossing, Increasing correspondence",

author = "Pavlo Prokopovych and Yannelis, \{Nicholas C.\}",

year = "2017",

doi = "10.1016/j.jmateco.2017.02.007",

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AU - Yannelis, Nicholas C.

PY - 2017

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AB - This paper studies the existence of a pure strategy Nash equilibrium in games with strategic complementarities where the strategy sets are totally ordered. By relaxing the conventional conditions related to upper semicontinuity and single crossing, we enlarge the class of games to which monotone techniques are applicable. The results are illustrated with a number of economics-related examples.

KW - Discontinuous game

KW - Strategic complementarities

KW - Better-reply security

KW - Directional transfer single crossing

KW - Increasing correspondence

U2 - 10.1016/j.jmateco.2017.02.007

DO - 10.1016/j.jmateco.2017.02.007

M3 - Article

SN - 0304-4068

VL - 70

SP - 147

EP - 153

JO - Journal of Mathematical Economics

JF - Journal of Mathematical Economics

ER -

On strategic complementarities in discontinuous games with totally ordered strategies

Abstract

Keywords

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