Optimal law enforcement with legal aid

Nuno Garoupa; Frank H. Stephen

doi:10.1111/j.0013-0427.2004.00382.x

Optimal law enforcement with legal aid

Nuno Garoupa, Frank H. Stephen

Law

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

The economic literature on enforcement is generally pessimistic concerning the use of legal aid. In this paper we show that legal aid can be a part of optimal law enforcement. The rationale behind our result is that with legal aid, in a system with legal or judicial error both guilty and innocent individuals are better off, because the marginal cost of defence expenditure is reduced. If, on average, legal aid helps the innocent more than the guilty, a government seeking to maximize social welfare will want to use it in order to increase deterrence. © The London School of Economics and Political Science, 2004.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	493-500
Number of pages	7
Journal	Economica
Volume	71
Issue number	283
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0013-0427.2004.00382.x
Publication status	Published - Aug 2004

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10.1111/j.0013-0427.2004.00382.x

Cite this

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title = "Optimal law enforcement with legal aid",

abstract = "The economic literature on enforcement is generally pessimistic concerning the use of legal aid. In this paper we show that legal aid can be a part of optimal law enforcement. The rationale behind our result is that with legal aid, in a system with legal or judicial error both guilty and innocent individuals are better off, because the marginal cost of defence expenditure is reduced. If, on average, legal aid helps the innocent more than the guilty, a government seeking to maximize social welfare will want to use it in order to increase deterrence. {\textcopyright} The London School of Economics and Political Science, 2004.",

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AU - Stephen, Frank H.

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AB - The economic literature on enforcement is generally pessimistic concerning the use of legal aid. In this paper we show that legal aid can be a part of optimal law enforcement. The rationale behind our result is that with legal aid, in a system with legal or judicial error both guilty and innocent individuals are better off, because the marginal cost of defence expenditure is reduced. If, on average, legal aid helps the innocent more than the guilty, a government seeking to maximize social welfare will want to use it in order to increase deterrence. © The London School of Economics and Political Science, 2004.

U2 - 10.1111/j.0013-0427.2004.00382.x

DO - 10.1111/j.0013-0427.2004.00382.x

M3 - Article

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VL - 71

SP - 493

EP - 500

JO - Economica

JF - Economica

IS - 283

ER -

Optimal law enforcement with legal aid

Abstract

UN SDGs

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