Optimal regulatory control of early contract termination

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    We present a quantitative method to find jointly optimal strategies for an industry regulator and a firm who operate under exogenous uncertainty. The firm controls its operating policy in order to maximize its expected future profits whilst taking account of regulatory fines. The regulator aims to control the probability of the firm terminating production by imposing a closure fine which is as low as possible, while achieving the required reduction in probability. Our method determines the level of fine which establishes a Nash equilibrium in these non-zero-sum games under uncertainty.
    Original languageEnglish
    Pages (from-to)313-328
    Number of pages15
    JournalIMA Journal of Management Mathematics
    Issue number3
    Publication statusPublished - 23 May 2013


    • optimal control
    • probabilistic constraints
    • real options
    • regulation
    • uncertainty


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