Perception Management, Lying and the Democratic Peace: the case of the September Dossier and the 2003 Iraq War

This article analyses the British government’s controversial September 2002 Dossier on alleged Iraqi WMD. Reviewing the evidence presented across three Inquiries, leaked documents and secondary sources, the article addresses key that have remained at the center of academic and political debate. These include the question of whether the dossier was part of a perception management campaign, the extent to which lying was involved, and the implications of the dossier for debates over perception management and the democratic peace. It is argued that the available evidence is consistent with the dossier being part of a perception management campaign, co-ordinated with the U.S., and aimed at mobilizing both domestic and international audiences (including the U.N. Security Council). Evidence is also presented to show that the dossier moved beyond mere spin and deception to include lying with the aim of fearmongering. The case highlights the deleterious effects of perception management upon the ability of media to remain independent of government and provide adequate information to the public. Because of this, assumptions regarding domestic-level constraints, which form part of the structural model of the democratic peace thesis, are brought into question.