Personal Sacrifice and the Value of Solidarity

I first propose a two-fold conceptual puzzle: (1) In virtue of which features are some self-sacrifices solidaristic, whilst other are not? (2) In virtue of which features are self-sacrificial and non-self-sacrificial instances of solidarity part of a unified phenomenon? After setting out (1) and (2) with the help of some cases, I criticize two recent motivation-based solutions that start from explaining what unifies sacrificial and non-sacrificial cases of solidarity. Though valuable, I maintain that ‘content-based’ accounts cannot explain why some cases of self-sacrifice do not count as solidaristic (1). To address this, I develop a functionalist alternative. Solidarity is not simply concerned with fostering ‘concern’ or establishing ‘community’, but it serves a specific function. It helps to mitigate a conflict in our outlook between moral duty and living an autonomous life. In solidarity, we build projects and relationships based on morality-given criteria. This suggests a solution to the puzzle of non-solidaristic sacrifice: where the agent’s self-interest diverges drastically from the course of action recommended by the moral cause, there is no way of realizing the described function and, therefore, we do not speak of solidarity.