TY - JOUR
T1 - Predeterminism as a category error
T2 - Why Aribiah Attoe got it wrong
AU - Ben, Patrick
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2023 South African Journal of Philosophy.
PY - 2023/8/11
Y1 - 2023/8/11
N2 - I aim to establish in this article why Aribiah Attoe, like other determinists before him, got it wrong in arguing for the possibility of predeterminism in a materially evolving universe. I will do this by proving two things: I will first establish the inconsistency of the idea of predeterminism in an evolving universe. Then, I argue that the adirectionality presupposed by an evolutionary universe gives room for free will and negates the argument for a predeterministic universe. I aim to achieve the above by exposing why the view which upholds the universe and all existents within it as lacking free will – or the possibility of adirectionality – stems from a category error on the part of the determinists. Lastly, I defend the position that for predeterminism to stand a chance against the free will of animate things-in-the-world, it must deny the possibility of an evolving/expanding universe that is adirectional and suggestive of boundlessness, and the possibility that some events are not fundamentally necessary reactions to previous states of affairs.
AB - I aim to establish in this article why Aribiah Attoe, like other determinists before him, got it wrong in arguing for the possibility of predeterminism in a materially evolving universe. I will do this by proving two things: I will first establish the inconsistency of the idea of predeterminism in an evolving universe. Then, I argue that the adirectionality presupposed by an evolutionary universe gives room for free will and negates the argument for a predeterministic universe. I aim to achieve the above by exposing why the view which upholds the universe and all existents within it as lacking free will – or the possibility of adirectionality – stems from a category error on the part of the determinists. Lastly, I defend the position that for predeterminism to stand a chance against the free will of animate things-in-the-world, it must deny the possibility of an evolving/expanding universe that is adirectional and suggestive of boundlessness, and the possibility that some events are not fundamentally necessary reactions to previous states of affairs.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85167827980&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1080/02580136.2023.2211824
DO - 10.1080/02580136.2023.2211824
M3 - Article
SN - 0258-0136
VL - 42
SP - 13
EP - 23
JO - South African Journal of Philosophy
JF - South African Journal of Philosophy
IS - 1
ER -