Abstract
For the duration of gestation the welfare of a foetus is dependent on the behaviour of the woman carrying it. Pregnant women who make detrimental lifestyle choices risk severely harming the foetus and condemning it to substance addiction, long-term developmental impairments, severe birth deformities or premature death. It will be assumed that once a woman decides to carry her pregnancy to term she is morally responsible for that choice, and consequently foetal welfare. It does not follow, however, that the law should place obligations on pregnant women that mirror these responsibilities.
This paper critically explores the extent to which the law currently enforces these moral responsibilities in the civil and criminal law and by actively intervening in choices during pregnancy and childbirth. It then explores the extent to which any imposition of liability or intervention can be justified with particular focus on foetal welfare and the privacy, autonomy and liberty of women. It argues that no active or passive intervention with the decision-making of pregnant women, even if their behaviour risks severely harming an unborn child, is justifiable because of the constraint it would place on the freedom of all women and because intervention is unlikely to better secure foetal welfare.
This paper critically explores the extent to which the law currently enforces these moral responsibilities in the civil and criminal law and by actively intervening in choices during pregnancy and childbirth. It then explores the extent to which any imposition of liability or intervention can be justified with particular focus on foetal welfare and the privacy, autonomy and liberty of women. It argues that no active or passive intervention with the decision-making of pregnant women, even if their behaviour risks severely harming an unborn child, is justifiable because of the constraint it would place on the freedom of all women and because intervention is unlikely to better secure foetal welfare.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 69 |
Number of pages | 17 |
Journal | The Manchester Review of Law, Crime and Ethics |
Volume | 6 |
Publication status | Published - 1 Oct 2017 |