Prioritarianism and the Levelling Down Objection

Thomas Porter

doi:10.1007/s10677-010-9231-1

Prioritarianism and the Levelling Down Objection

Thomas Porter

Politics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

I discuss Ingmar Persson's recent argument that the Levelling Down Objection could be worse for prioritarians than for egalitarians. Persson's argument depends upon the claim that indifference to changes in the average prioritarian value of benefits implies indifference to changes in the overall prioritarian value of a state of affairs. As I show, however, sensible conceptions of prioritarianism have no such implication. Therefore prioritarians have nothing to fear from the Levelling Down Objection. © 2010 Springer Science+Business Media B.V.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	197-206
Number of pages	9
Journal	Ethical theory and Moral Practice
Volume	14
Issue number	2
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-010-9231-1
Publication status	Published - Apr 2011

Keywords

Equality
Levelling down objection
Parfit
Persson
Prioritarianism
Priority view

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10.1007/s10677-010-9231-1

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AB - I discuss Ingmar Persson's recent argument that the Levelling Down Objection could be worse for prioritarians than for egalitarians. Persson's argument depends upon the claim that indifference to changes in the average prioritarian value of benefits implies indifference to changes in the overall prioritarian value of a state of affairs. As I show, however, sensible conceptions of prioritarianism have no such implication. Therefore prioritarians have nothing to fear from the Levelling Down Objection. © 2010 Springer Science+Business Media B.V.

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KW - Levelling down objection

KW - Parfit

KW - Persson

KW - Prioritarianism

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Prioritarianism and the Levelling Down Objection

Abstract

Keywords

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