Propositional or non-propositional attitudes?

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

479 Downloads (Pure)


Propositionalism is the view that intentional attitudes, such as belief, are relations to propositions. Propositionalists argue that propositionalism follows from the intuitive validity of certain kinds of inferences involving attitude reports. Jubien (Philos Stud 104(1):47-62, 2001) argues powerfully against propositions and sketches some interesting positive proposals, based on Russell's multiple relation theory of judgment, about how to accommodate "propositional phenomena" without appeal to propositions. This paper argues that none of Jubien's proposals succeeds in accommodating an important range of propositional phenomena, such as the aforementioned validity of attitude-report inferences. It then shows that the notion of a predication act-type, which remains importantly Russellian in spirit, is sufficient to explain the range of propositional phenomena in question, in particular the validity of attitude-report inferences. The paper concludes by discussing whether predication act-types are really just propositions by another name. © 2013 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)179-210
Number of pages31
JournalPhilosophical Studies
Issue number1
Publication statusPublished - Mar 2014


  • Act-type
  • Michael Jubien
  • Predication
  • Propositional attitudes
  • Propositions
  • Quantification


Dive into the research topics of 'Propositional or non-propositional attitudes?'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this