TY - JOUR
T1 - Psychiatric Euthanasia and the Ontology of Mental Disorder
AU - Maung, Hane
N1 - Funding Information:
I would like to thank Phoebe Friesen and Rachel Cooper for their generous comments on a draft of this article. Thanks also go to the attendees of the workshop on Politics, the Law, and Ontology at the University of Manchester, where a version of this article was presented and discussed. I would also like to thank the anonymous referees who took the time and care to review the article. I am grateful to the Leverhulme Trust for supporting this research through an Early Career Fellowship for a project entitled "Suicide, Disorder, and Causal Judgements: A Philosophical Investigation" (grant reference ECF‐2017‐298).
Publisher Copyright:
© 2020 The Authors. Journal of Applied Philosophy published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of Society for Applied Philosophy
PY - 2020/9/6
Y1 - 2020/9/6
N2 - In the Netherlands and Belgium, it is lawful for voluntary euthanasia to be offered on the grounds of psychiatric suffering. A recent case that has sparked much debate is that of Aurelia Brouwers, who was helped to die in the Netherlands on account of her suffering from borderline personality disorder. It is sometimes claimed that whether or not a mentally ill person’s wish to die is valid hinges on whether or not that wish is a symptom of the person’s mental disorder. This article addresses the philosophical problems raised by this claim, with a specific focus on the diagnosis of borderline personality disorder. After considering descriptivist and causal conceptualizations of mental disorder, I argue that the current approach to borderline personality disorder in psychiatry precludes the possibility of dissociating the wish to die from the disorder. I then examine the implications of this analysis for the question of whether or not the request for voluntary euthanasia in the case of borderline personality disorder can be considered valid. Ultimately, I conclude that the inability to dissociate the wish to die from the disorder does not invalidate the wish in the case of borderline personality disorder.
AB - In the Netherlands and Belgium, it is lawful for voluntary euthanasia to be offered on the grounds of psychiatric suffering. A recent case that has sparked much debate is that of Aurelia Brouwers, who was helped to die in the Netherlands on account of her suffering from borderline personality disorder. It is sometimes claimed that whether or not a mentally ill person’s wish to die is valid hinges on whether or not that wish is a symptom of the person’s mental disorder. This article addresses the philosophical problems raised by this claim, with a specific focus on the diagnosis of borderline personality disorder. After considering descriptivist and causal conceptualizations of mental disorder, I argue that the current approach to borderline personality disorder in psychiatry precludes the possibility of dissociating the wish to die from the disorder. I then examine the implications of this analysis for the question of whether or not the request for voluntary euthanasia in the case of borderline personality disorder can be considered valid. Ultimately, I conclude that the inability to dissociate the wish to die from the disorder does not invalidate the wish in the case of borderline personality disorder.
UR - https://pureprojects.ppad.man.ac.uk/portal/en/publications/psychiatric-euthanasia-and-the-ontology-of-mental-disorder(5dbc7758-ca71-4ece-ad47-b96d2e0f929e).html
U2 - 10.1111/japp.12462
DO - 10.1111/japp.12462
M3 - Article
SN - 0264-3758
VL - 38
SP - 136
EP - 154
JO - Journal of Applied Philosophy
JF - Journal of Applied Philosophy
IS - 1
ER -