Public Expenditures, Bureaucratic Corruption, and Development

K. Blackburn, N. Bose, M. Emranul Haque

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


We present a dynamic general equilibrium analysis of public sector corruption and economic growth. In an economy with government intervention and capital accumulation, state-appointed bureaucrats are responsibile for procuring public goods which contribute to productive efficiency. Corruption arises because of an opportunity for bureaucrats to appropriate public funds by misinforming the government about the cost and quality of public goods provision. The incentive for each bureaucrat to do this depends on economy-wide outcomes which, in turn, depend on the behaviour of all bureaucrats. We establish the existence of multiple development regimes, together with the possibility of multiple, frequency-dependent equilibria. The predictions of our analysis accord strongly with recent empirical evidence.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)405-428
Number of pages24
JournalManchester School
Issue number3
Publication statusPublished - Jun 2011


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