Regulation, reputation, and environmental risk

Prasenjit Banerjee; Jason F. Shogren

doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2009.09.021

Regulation, reputation, and environmental risk

Prasenjit Banerjee, Jason F. Shogren

Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

This paper examines how preferences for social reputation affect the design of monetary incentives in an efficient mechanism for environmental risk. Our results are a high reputation firm receives less than optimal transfer; the low reputation firm sacrifices information rent. © 2009 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	45-47
Number of pages	2
Journal	Economics Letters
Volume	106
Issue number	1
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2009.09.021
Publication status	Published - Jan 2010

Keywords

Environmental risk
Information rent
Mechanism
Reputation

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10.1016/j.econlet.2009.09.021

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title = "Regulation, reputation, and environmental risk",

abstract = "This paper examines how preferences for social reputation affect the design of monetary incentives in an efficient mechanism for environmental risk. Our results are a high reputation firm receives less than optimal transfer; the low reputation firm sacrifices information rent. {\textcopyright} 2009 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.",

keywords = "Environmental risk, Information rent, Mechanism, Reputation",

author = "Prasenjit Banerjee and Shogren, {Jason F.}",

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AB - This paper examines how preferences for social reputation affect the design of monetary incentives in an efficient mechanism for environmental risk. Our results are a high reputation firm receives less than optimal transfer; the low reputation firm sacrifices information rent. © 2009 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

KW - Environmental risk

KW - Information rent

KW - Mechanism

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JO - Economics Letters

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Regulation, reputation, and environmental risk

Abstract

Keywords

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