TY - JOUR
T1 - Relationality of intentionality
AU - Zarepour, Mohammad Saleh
N1 - Funding Information:
This work was supported by the Alexander von Humboldt-Stiftung. I am extremely thankful to the reviewers of this paper for their helpful comments and suggestions.
Publisher Copyright:
© 2021 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group.
PY - 2021/4/19
Y1 - 2021/4/19
N2 - At face value, intentionality is a relational notion. There are, however, arguments intended to show that it is not. I categorize the strongest arguments against the relationality of intentionality into three major groups: Brentanian arguments, Fregean arguments, and Quinean arguments. I argue that, despite their prima facie plausibility, none of these arguments eventually succeeds. I then conclude that, in the absence of defeating evidence against what at face value looks correct, we are justified to consider intentionality as a relational notion.
AB - At face value, intentionality is a relational notion. There are, however, arguments intended to show that it is not. I categorize the strongest arguments against the relationality of intentionality into three major groups: Brentanian arguments, Fregean arguments, and Quinean arguments. I argue that, despite their prima facie plausibility, none of these arguments eventually succeeds. I then conclude that, in the absence of defeating evidence against what at face value looks correct, we are justified to consider intentionality as a relational notion.
KW - Aboutness
KW - Adverbialism
KW - Intentional Inexistence
KW - Intentionality
KW - Relational Intentionality
U2 - 10.1080/09515089.2021.1914327
DO - 10.1080/09515089.2021.1914327
M3 - Article
SN - 0951-5089
VL - 34
SP - 660
EP - 683
JO - Philosophical Psychology
JF - Philosophical Psychology
IS - 5
ER -