Relationality of intentionality

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


At face value, intentionality is a relational notion. There are, however, arguments intended to show that it is not. I categorize the strongest arguments against the relationality of intentionality into three major groups: Brentanian arguments, Fregean arguments, and Quinean arguments. I argue that, despite their prima facie plausibility, none of these arguments eventually succeeds. I then conclude that, in the absence of defeating evidence against what at face value looks correct, we are justified to consider intentionality as a relational notion.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)660-683
Number of pages24
JournalPhilosophical Psychology
Issue number5
Publication statusPublished - 19 Apr 2021


  • Aboutness
  • Adverbialism
  • Intentional Inexistence
  • Intentionality
  • Relational Intentionality


Dive into the research topics of 'Relationality of intentionality'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this