Abstract
Developing countries adopt modern competition laws based on international blue- prints for motivations ranging from gaining international legitimacy to achieving do- mestic economic goals. However, whilst adopting such laws confers some legitimacy on the competition regimes of these countries, it does not automatically translate into the realization of their economic goals unless the laws are also meaningfully enforced. Comparative law literature, viewed in the light of development economics, suggests that meaningful enforcement entails, among other things, a productive interaction be- tween the adopted laws and the pre-existing legal systems of the countries. In this arti- cle, I identify possible interactions between competition laws and pre-existing legal sys- tems in India and Pakistan and compare the interactions that actually occur in the two countries. I observe that, although India and Pakistan have nearly identical pre-existing legal systems and adopted similar competition laws within five years of each other, the interactions of these competition laws with the pre-existing legal systems in the coun- tries are remarkably different. I argue that the nature of interactions in a country is sub- stantially shaped by the strategy, mechanisms, and legal and political institutions through which it adopts its competition law. I also demonstrate that the type of inter- action has an observable impact on the enforcement of competition law in that country.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 75-103 |
Number of pages | 29 |
Journal | Journal of Antitrust Enforcement |
Volume | 7 |
Issue number | 1 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 28 Sept 2018 |
Keywords
- Comparative Law
- Competition
- Courts
- Development economics
- Enforcement
- Institutions