Setting UK standards on the concept of control: An analysis of lobbying behaviour

Renata Stenka, Peter Taylor

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

The present study aims to contribute to an understanding of the complexity of lobbying activities within the accounting standard-setting process in the UK. The paper reports detailed content analysis of submission letters to four related exposure drafts. These preceded two accounting standards that setout the concept of control used to determine the scope of consolidation in the UK, except for reporting under international standards. Regulation on the concept of control provides rich patterns of lobbying behaviour due to its controversial nature and its significance to financial reporting. Our examination is conducted by dividing lobbyists into two categories, corporate and non-corporate, which are hypothesised (and demonstrated) to lobby differently. In order to test the significance of these differences we apply ANOVA techniques and univariate regression analysis. Corporate respondents are found to devote more attention to issues of specific applicability of the concept of control, whereas non-corporate respondents tend to devote more attention to issues of general applicability of this concept. A strong association between the issues raised by corporate respondents and their line of business is revealed. Both categories of lobbyists are found to advance conceptually-based arguments more often than economic consequences-based or combined arguments. However, when economic consequences-based arguments are used, they come exclusively from the corporate category of respondents.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)109-130
Number of pages21
JournalAccounting and Business Research
Volume40
Issue number2
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2010

Keywords

  • Accounting standards
  • Consolidated financial statements
  • Lobbying

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