Sharing Nonconvex Costs

I. V. Evstigneev; S. D. Flam

doi:10.1023/A:1017599310112

Sharing Nonconvex Costs

I. V. Evstigneev, S. D. Flam

Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

The paper analyzes cooperative games with side payments. Each player faces a possibly non-convex optimization problem, interpreted as production planning, constrained by his resources or technology. Coalitions can aggregate (or pool) members' contributions. We discuss instances where such aggregation eliminates or reduces the lack of convexity. Core solutions are computed or approximated via dual programs associated to the grand coalition.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	257-271
Number of pages	14
Journal	Journal of Global Optimization
Volume	20
Issue number	3-4
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1017599310112
Publication status	Published - Aug 2001

Keywords

Cooperative games
Core allocations
Duality gap
Lack of convexity
Production games

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10.1023/A:1017599310112

http://www.springerlink.com/content/l0541855730216n0/fulltext.pdf

Cite this

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title = "Sharing Nonconvex Costs",

abstract = "The paper analyzes cooperative games with side payments. Each player faces a possibly non-convex optimization problem, interpreted as production planning, constrained by his resources or technology. Coalitions can aggregate (or pool) members' contributions. We discuss instances where such aggregation eliminates or reduces the lack of convexity. Core solutions are computed or approximated via dual programs associated to the grand coalition.",

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AB - The paper analyzes cooperative games with side payments. Each player faces a possibly non-convex optimization problem, interpreted as production planning, constrained by his resources or technology. Coalitions can aggregate (or pool) members' contributions. We discuss instances where such aggregation eliminates or reduces the lack of convexity. Core solutions are computed or approximated via dual programs associated to the grand coalition.

KW - Cooperative games

KW - Core allocations

KW - Duality gap

KW - Lack of convexity

KW - Production games

U2 - 10.1023/A:1017599310112

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M3 - Article

VL - 20

SP - 257

EP - 271

JO - Journal of Global Optimization

JF - Journal of Global Optimization

IS - 3-4

ER -

Sharing Nonconvex Costs

Abstract

Keywords

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