Skeptizismus, naturalismus und quine

This paper examines Quine's dismissal of external world skepticism. Quine maintains that since skeptical doubts are scientific doubts we can neutralize the skeptical challenge empirically without begging the question. On closer inspection, it becomes apparent that Quine's only argument against skepticism is his naturalism. Naturalism states that because we cannot adopt an external perspective onto our beliefs about the world the skeptic's mistake is to demand that we gain an objective understanding of human knowledge. Given naturalism, skeptical challenges, though not incoherent, are idle, artificial, and neurotic. Since Quine's dismissal of skepticism is grounded on his naturalism the question arises: what are the grounds for naturalism? Quine's only reason for adopting naturalism is his confidence in the natural sciences. Probably he refuses to argue for naturalism because the skeptic would reject the argument in any case. Yet since Quine doesn't even try to justify his naturalistic anti-skepticism he robs himself of the possibility to understand the deeper significance of skepticism.