Abstract
We propose a simple model in which agents are matched in pairs in order to complete a task of unit size. The preferences of agents are single-peaked and continuous on the amount of time they devote to it. Our model combines features of two models: assignment games (Shapley and Shubik (1971)) and the division problem (Sprumont (1991)). We provide an algorithm (Select-Allocate-Match) that generates a stable and Pareto efficient allocation. We show that stable allocations may fail to exist if either the single-peakedness or the continuity assumption fail.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 337-363 |
Journal | Games and Economic Behavior |
Early online date | 6 Jul 2023 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 1 Sept 2023 |
Keywords
- job sharing
- matching
- stability
- Pareto efficiency