Stable Sharing

Antonio Nicolo, Pietro Salmaso, Arunava Sen, Sonal Yadav

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We propose a simple model in which agents are matched in pairs in order to complete a task of unit size. The preferences of agents are single-peaked and continuous on the amount of time they devote to it. Our model combines features of two models: assignment games (Shapley and Shubik (1971)) and the division problem (Sprumont (1991)). We provide an algorithm (Select-Allocate-Match) that generates a stable and Pareto efficient allocation. We show that stable allocations may fail to exist if either the single-peakedness or the continuity assumption fail.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)337-363
JournalGames and Economic Behavior
Early online date6 Jul 2023
Publication statusPublished - 1 Sept 2023


  • job sharing
  • matching
  • stability
  • Pareto efficiency


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