T-Philosophy

Criticism of metaphilosophy may take one of two forms: general or special. The later Wittgenstein dismissed theoretical philosophy, taking it to be permeated by linguistic confusions and driven by a misguided effort to emulate science. In Paul Horwich's book Wittgenstein's Metaphilosophy these radical contentions receive explicit and sustained argumentative support. Horwich's principal target is what he calls “T-philosophy.” “T” is to suggest both “traditional” and “theoretical” philosophy. The aim of T-philosophy is the “construction and defence of important philosophical theories”. Having sought to rebut Horwich's arguments for his anti-theoretical metaphilosophy, it is also useful to evaluate his metaphilosophy by focusing on a particular case. This chapter considers his attempted dissolution of the problem of the knowledge of numbers. In response to Williamson, Horwich entertains the fallback position that some of his claims are empirical theoretical conjectures.