The citizen-candidate model with imperfect policy control: Strategic delegation and polarization

R. Emre Aytimur, Aristotelis Boukouras, Robert Schwager

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

We present a modified citizen-candidate model where the implemented policy arises from a compromise between the government and an unelected external power. We show that the two-candidate equilibria of this model differ significantly from the original: however small the cost of candidacy, the distance between the candidates' policies, both ideal and implemented, remains strictly above a threshold. Moreover, there may be one-candidate equilibria in which the only candidate is not the one most preferred by the median voter. Both results point out that, even with negligible cost of entry, there are limits to strategic delegation.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)997-1015
Number of pages19
JournalCanadian Journal of Economics
Volume49
Issue number3
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Aug 2016

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