The emergence and implementation of pool exclusion in spatial public goods game with heterogeneous ability-to-pay

Junjun Zheng, Tianyu Ren, Gang Ma, Jinhui Dong

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

Exploring the conditions and mechanisms for the emergence of cooperation in human society has important theoretical and practical significance. Social exclusion has been considered a powerful sanction for promoting and sustaining cooperation. However, whether the heterogeneity of the ability-to-pay of individuals can still favor cooperation when exclusion is introduced remains unclear. On the basis of this consideration, the dynamic cost of pool exclusion is taken into account in the public goods game, which focuses on the evolution process of each strategy in a square lattice. Specifically, we describe the cost of exclusion behavior as a function of payoff, while the probability of exclusion depends on the former. Through conducting Monte Carlo simulations, the effects of parameters on the evolution of cooperation are investigated. The results indicate that pool exclusion can promote cooperative behaviors within a wide range of parameters. Moreover, structured populations can form an effective alliance to sweep out defection, which requires a few excluders. This alliance continues to function even under strong dilemma strength. We further confirm that overinvestment in exclusion is unwanted. These results may help researchers better understand the emergence and implementation of social exclusion, and provide new insight into the analysis of the origin of cooperation for further exploration.
Original languageEnglish
Article number125835
Pages (from-to)1-12
Number of pages12
JournalApplied Mathematics and Computation
Volume394
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Apr 2021

Keywords

  • evolutionary game theory
  • heterogeneous ability-to-pay
  • social exclusion
  • spatial public goods game

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