TY - GEN
T1 - The Global Credit Crisis and International Financial Regulation
AU - Avgouleas, E.
N1 - The SSRN paper is cited in: Mónica García-Salmones, 'Taking Uncertainty Seriously: Adaptive Governance and International Trade: A Reply to Rosie Cooney and Andrew Lang' (2009) 20 The European Journal of International Law 167-186, p. 182. Michal Kempa, 'Liquidity crisis in the interbank market' 3 June 2008, http://ssrn.com/abstract=1138705 Liu Dong Min, 金融危机背景下的金融监管理论:文献综述 , Research Center for International Finance China, Working Paper No. 0909, 1 August 2009, http://www.moneyqoo.com/report/2009-08-23/cd96ece959626920fb5c81d11ce9fc79.pdf and is discussed extensively (along with the work of world famous economists) in Hindustan Times Blogs: 'Planning the death of prudence' 8 March 2009, http://blogs.hindustantimes.com/cutting-the-edge/2009/03/08/planning-the-death-of-prudence/#
PY - 2008/5
Y1 - 2008/5
N2 - The global credit crisis has led to systemic instability, the accrual of massive losses in major US and European banks, and created significant public costs. It has also shown that the current model of national and international banking regulation is inadequate. This paper attempts to answer questions relating to the future shape of national and international financial regulation in light of lessons drawn from this crisis. While most policy proposals for the overhaul of the US, UK, and international financial regulation predominantly deal with issues relating to the containment of a systemic crisis, the paper offers more radical solutions, which deal with the prevention of such a crisis. In this mode, it suggests a pluralistic regime for the licensing and supervision of banking institutions at a domestic level and the establishment of a global multi-tiered licensing and supervisory scheme for transnational investment funds with systemic importance. The supervision of investment funds’ compliance with the suggested prudential regime should be assigned to an independent global regulatory authority, which would utilize the market research and surveillance infrastructure of the IMF. The findings of behavioural finance provide solid support for the suggested reforms.
AB - The global credit crisis has led to systemic instability, the accrual of massive losses in major US and European banks, and created significant public costs. It has also shown that the current model of national and international banking regulation is inadequate. This paper attempts to answer questions relating to the future shape of national and international financial regulation in light of lessons drawn from this crisis. While most policy proposals for the overhaul of the US, UK, and international financial regulation predominantly deal with issues relating to the containment of a systemic crisis, the paper offers more radical solutions, which deal with the prevention of such a crisis. In this mode, it suggests a pluralistic regime for the licensing and supervision of banking institutions at a domestic level and the establishment of a global multi-tiered licensing and supervisory scheme for transnational investment funds with systemic importance. The supervision of investment funds’ compliance with the suggested prudential regime should be assigned to an independent global regulatory authority, which would utilize the market research and surveillance infrastructure of the IMF. The findings of behavioural finance provide solid support for the suggested reforms.
KW - Global Credit Crisis
KW - Behavioural Finance
KW - Banks
KW - Banking Regulation
KW - Hedge Funds
KW - International Financial Regulation
KW - Securitisations
KW - CDOs
KW - Systemic Risk
M3 - Conference contribution
BT - Oxford University Law Faculty, Financial Law Discussion Group
T2 - OXford Financial Law Discussion Group
Y2 - 1 January 1824
ER -