Corporate governance in the European Union (EU) has been traditionally seen as a problem of harmonizing or co-ordinating national systems. Here the focus is on the interactions between corporate governance on the one hand and macroeconomic policy on the other. It is argued that the function of corporate governance is a process determined by a structurally embedded dynamic game between major stakeholders and the corporation. The article argues that Economic Monetary Union (EMU) institutions and policymaking, as elements of the institutional environment in which this game is embedded, determine particular parties' bargaining power and through this the outcome of the corporate governance game and its trajectory. The main focus is on the bargains between labour and financial capital with the corporation, which is mostly destabilized in the EU-EMU environment. The findings carry an important message for postcrisis restructuring. © The Author 2013. Published by Oxford University Press. All rights reserved.
|Number of pages||26|
|Journal||Oxford Journal of Legal Studies|
|Publication status||Published - Sep 2013|
- Bargaining power
- Corporate governance
- Corporate law