The Intentionality and Intelligibility of Moods

Jonathan Mitchell

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This article offers an account of moods as distinctive kinds of personal level affective–evaluative states, which are both intentional and rationally intelligible in specific ways. The account contrasts with those who claim moods are non‐intentional, and so also arational. Section 2 provides a conception of intentionality and distinguishes moods, as occurrent experiential states, from other states in the affective domain. Section 3 argues moods target the subject's total environment presented in a specific evaluative light through felt valenced attitudes (the Mood‐Intentionality thesis). Section 4 argues some moods are experienced as rationally intelligible responses, and so epistemically appropriate, to the way “the world” presents itself (the Mood‐Intelligibility thesis). Finally, Section 5 discusses the epistemology of moods.
Original languageEnglish
JournalEuropean Journal of Philosophy
Early online date23 Jul 2018
Publication statusPublished - 2018


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