Abstract
This essay offers a general account of the idea of impartiality and examines the senses in which adjudication is and is not impartial. Against those who would derive an account of impartiality from more general moral or political theories, the essay shows that ordinary thought embodies a coherent and reasonably rich conception of impartiality, some of the principal features of which are also in play in adjudication. Against those who claim that impartiality in adjudication is impossible or illusory, it is argued that there are some meaningful senses in which adjudication is indeed impartial. The essay concludes that in the adjudicative context impartiality might even be considered a virtue, albeit a limited one. © The Author 2005. Published by Oxford University Press. All rights reserved.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 3-31 |
| Number of pages | 28 |
| Journal | Oxford Journal of Legal Studies |
| Volume | 25 |
| Issue number | 1 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - Mar 2005 |