Abstract
In the introduction to his Realism, Mathematics, and Modality (1989), and in earlier papers included in that collection, Hartry Field offered an epistemological challenge to platonism in the philosophy of mathematics. Justin Clarke-Doane (2016) argues that Field’s challenge is an illusion: it does not pose a genuine problem for platonism. My aim is to show that Clarke-Doane’s argument relies on a misunderstanding of Field’s challenge.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 1027–1031 |
Journal | Erkenntnis |
Volume | 83 |
Early online date | 18 Jul 2017 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 2018 |
Keywords
- platonism, epistemological objection, abstract objects, Field, Benacerraf, Clarke-Doane