Third‐person knowledge ascriptions: A crucial experiment for contextualism

Jumbly Grindrod, James Andow, Nat Hansen

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


Previous experimental studies on epistemic contextualism have, for the most part, not been designed to distinguish between contextualism and one of its main competing theories, subject‐sensitive invariantism (SSI). In this paper, we present a “third‐person” experimental design that is needed to provide evidence that would support contextualism over SSI, and we then present our results using this design. Our results not only provide crucial support for contextualism over SSI, but also buck the general trend of failing to detect the kind of contextual effect that the epistemic contextualism relies upon.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)158-182
Number of pages25
JournalMind and Language
Publication statusPublished - 5 Jul 2018


  • Epistemology
  • Experimental Philosophy
  • Experimental Epistemology
  • Contextualism
  • Knowledge Ascriptions
  • Subject-Sensitive Invariantism


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