Trade in bilateral oligopoly with endogenous market formation

Alex Dickson, Roger Hartley

Research output: Preprint/Working paperWorking paper

Abstract

We study a strategic market game in which traders are endowed with both a good and money and can choose whether to buy or sell the good. We derive conditions under which a non-autarkic equilibrium exists and when the only equilibrium is autarky. Autarky is ‘nice’ (robust to small perturbations in the game) when it is the only equilibrium, and ‘very nice’ (robust to large perturbations) when no gains from trade exist. We characterize economies where autarky is nice but not very nice; that is, when gains from trade exist and yet no trade takes place.
Original languageEnglish
Place of PublicationGlasgow, UK
Number of pages20
Publication statusPublished - 1 Mar 2011

Publication series

NameUniversity of Strathclyde Business School Discussion Papers
PublisherUniversity of Strathclyde
No.11-04

Keywords

  • Bilateral oligopoly
  • Strategic market game
  • Trade

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