Abstract
This paper models transnational terrorism as a three-way strategic interaction involving a government that faces armed opposition at home, which may spill over in the form of acts of terrorism by the state's opponents against the government's external sponsor. The external sponsor also utilises deterrence against potential terrorists, which only lowers terrorism if terrorists are not intrinsically motivated by a deep-seated sense of humiliation. The model high-lights the importance of intrinsic motivation. A rise in the external power's preference for deterrence against terrorism may backfire in these circumstances. Increases in the government's military efficiency against the rebels, who are also terrorists against the government's sponsor, raises overall levels of violence. © 2005 Taylor & Francis Group Ltd.
Original language | English |
---|---|
Pages (from-to) | 69-82 |
Number of pages | 13 |
Journal | Defence and Peace Economics |
Volume | 16 |
Issue number | 2 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - Apr 2005 |
Keywords
- Conflict
- Intrinsic motivation
- Terrorism
Research Beacons, Institutes and Platforms
- Global Development Institute