Transplant quality and patients' preferences in paired kidney exchange

Antonio Nicoló, Carmelo Rodríguez-Álvarez

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

Paired Kidney Exchange (PKE) programs solve incompatibility problems of donor-patient pairs in living donor kidney transplantation by arranging exchanges of donors among several pairs. Further efficiency gains may emerge if the programs consider the quality of the matches between patients and donors. Limitations on the number of simultaneous required operations imply that every efficient PKE program introduces incentives for the patients to misreport how they rank the option of remaining in dialysis with respect to the available kidneys. Truthfully revealing their preferences is however, the unique protective (lexicographic maximin) strategy for patients under pairwise exchange maximizing PKE programs. © 2011 Elsevier Inc.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)299-310
Number of pages11
JournalGames and Economic Behavior
Volume74
Issue number1
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Jan 2012

Keywords

  • Kidney exchange
  • Market design
  • Matching
  • Protective behavior

Fingerprint

Dive into the research topics of 'Transplant quality and patients' preferences in paired kidney exchange'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this