Undominated rules with three alternatives in an almost unrestricted domain

Antonio Nicolo, Bernardo Moreno, Dolors Berga

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Abstract

We consider the collective decision problem of a society choosing among three alternatives on a strict preference domain in which one preference ordering over
alternatives is not admissible. We propose the family of Sequential Pareto Undominated Rules and characterize one of them as the unique full range, anonymous, tops-only, and strategy-proof voting rule.
Original languageEnglish
JournalSocial Choice and Welfare
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 26 Mar 2021

Keywords

  • strategy-proofness
  • anonymity
  • top-onliness

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