Undominated rules with three alternatives in an almost unrestricted domain

Antonio Nicolo; Bernardo Moreno; Dolors Berga

doi:10.1007/s00355-021-01330-1

Undominated rules with three alternatives in an almost unrestricted domain

Antonio Nicolo
, Bernardo Moreno
, Dolors Berga

Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

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Abstract

We consider the collective decision problem of a society choosing among three alternatives on a strict preference domain in which one preference ordering over
alternatives is not admissible. We propose the family of Sequential Pareto Undominated Rules and characterize one of them as the unique full range, anonymous, tops-only, and strategy-proof voting rule.

Original language	English
Journal	Social Choice and Welfare
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-021-01330-1
Publication status	Published - 26 Mar 2021

Keywords

strategy-proofness
anonymity
top-onliness

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SCW2021_undominatedAccepted author manuscript, 207 KB

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abstract = "We consider the collective decision problem of a society choosing among three alternatives on a strict preference domain in which one preference ordering over alternatives is not admissible. We propose the family of Sequential Pareto Undominated Rules and characterize one of them as the unique full range, anonymous, tops-only, and strategy-proof voting rule.",

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AU - Moreno, Bernardo

AU - Berga, Dolors

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AB - We consider the collective decision problem of a society choosing among three alternatives on a strict preference domain in which one preference ordering over alternatives is not admissible. We propose the family of Sequential Pareto Undominated Rules and characterize one of them as the unique full range, anonymous, tops-only, and strategy-proof voting rule.

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KW - anonymity

KW - top-onliness

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M3 - Article

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JO - Social Choice and Welfare

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Undominated rules with three alternatives in an almost unrestricted domain

Abstract

Keywords

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Cite this