Why Don’t Philosophers Do Their Intuition Practice?

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


I bet you don’t practice your philosophical intuitions. What’s your excuse? If you think philosophical training improves the reliability of philosophical intuitions, then practicing intuitions should improve them even further. I argue that philosophers’ reluctance to practice their intuitions highlights a tension in the way that they think about the role of intuitions in philosophy.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)257–269
Number of pages13
JournalActa Analytica
Publication statusPublished - 29 Sept 2019


  • Philosophy
  • Philosophical method
  • Philosophical methodology
  • Metaphilosophy
  • Intuitions
  • Expertise
  • Philosophical expertise


Dive into the research topics of 'Why Don’t Philosophers Do Their Intuition Practice?'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this