On the existence and structure of equilibrium in price-setting games

  • Robert Routledge

Student thesis: Phd


In this work the problematic issue of price determination in economic theory is re-examined.In the first chapter a state-of-the-art survey regarding the existence of equilibrium and thestructure of the equilibrium set in price-setting games is provided. In chapter two a newcore concept, the Bertrand core, is introduced and characterized. In chapter three a revealedpreference perspective upon the Nash equilibria in price-setting games is provided. In chapterfour, the issue of Bayesian equilibrium existence is addressed when traders have incompleteinformation regarding each others' types. Finally, a summary of possible future avenues forresearch in this area is provided.
Date of Award31 Dec 2011
Original languageEnglish
Awarding Institution
  • The University of Manchester
SupervisorChristopher Birchenhall (Supervisor) & Alejandro Saporiti (Supervisor)


  • equilibrium existence; price-making

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