Power Sharing, Income Redistribution and Corruption

  • Yizhi Wang

Student thesis: Unknown


In this thesis, we study how the power sharing mechanism in political system affect income redistribution and corruption. We find that more disproportional system has narrower representation but better accountability than proportional system. In other words, parties in a more disproportional system would target the interest of swing voter group at the cost of other groups more severely hence lead to higher income inequality, while they produce less political corruption as voters punish the misbehaviour better.
Date of Award1 Aug 2019
Original languageEnglish
Awarding Institution
  • The University of Manchester
SupervisorAlejandro Saporiti (Supervisor) & Antonio Nicolo (Supervisor)


  • Probabilistic Voting
  • Income Redistribution
  • Corruption
  • Power Sharing
  • Electoral Competition

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