Wellbeing, Reasons, and Paternalism

Abstract

This thesis addresses the question, when should we administer compulsory medical treatment? According to most contemporary liberal philosophers, if a person is making an autonomous choice not to have medical treatment, it would always be wrong to administer compulsory medical treatment. This thesis denies this view. It argues that there are a number of cases in which we should administer compulsory medical treatment, even if the person chooses, under ideal conditions, not to have medical treatment. The thesis tackles this issue by analyzing the nature of wellbeing, the value of autonomy, and the wrongness of paternalism.The thesis employs reasons as the basic normative unit, and argues that we should administer compulsory medical treatment if and only if (1) there is reason to administer compulsory medical treatment; and (2) there are no reasons not to administer compulsory medical treatment that defeat the reason to administer compulsory medical treatment. This provides the structure for the thesis, which is divided into two parts.The first part establishes that there is a reason to promote the value of wellbeing, and that from this it follows that, in many cases, there is a significant reason to administer compulsory medical treatment. The second part of the thesis examines and refutes a number of arguments that claim to provide reasons not to administer compulsory treatment, such as the argument that compulsory medical treatment is paternalistic. It concludes by briefly examining the practical implications of the arguments of the thesis.

Date of Award	31 Dec 2011
Original language	English
Awarding Institution	The University of Manchester
Supervisor	Kimberley Brownlee (Supervisor)