WORKERS' COMPENSATION CLAIMANT FRAUD INVESTIGATIONS: DETERRING LIGHT BLUE-COLLAR CRIME

Abstract

Programme evaluation research examined the criminological and socio-legal issues of a Claimant Fraud Investigation Program (CFIP) operating inside the workers' compensation system. Qualitative and quantitative methods were used to evaluate the programmes' choice of deterrence as an instrumental mechanism for achieving compliance. Key aspects of the programme were analysed from both criminological and socio-legal standpoints. Justice and liberty tensions were examined in reference to the programmes' deterrence mechanisms and the perceptions of fourteen participants' were thematically analysed. The study develops an analytically useful concept of light blue-collar crime that could be applied to other organisations and scenarios. The study concluded the programme is not effective and has more of a symbolic than instrumental value. It conducts itself ethically, however, there are problems with its' choice of deterrence and the study indicates there is a low probability for a deterrent effect. Recommendations are made for other actors and institutions to play non-deterrence based roles intended to achieve compliance.

Date of Award	1 Aug 2015
Original language	English
Awarding Institution	The University of Manchester
Supervisor	Jonathan Spencer (Supervisor) & Jonathan Shute (Supervisor)